Double Jeopardy - Retrial After Reversal of a Conviction on Evidentiary Grounds by Geary, Covert James
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 43 | Number 4
Symposium: Maritime Personal Injury
March 1983
Double Jeopardy - Retrial After Reversal of a
Conviction on Evidentiary Grounds
Covert James Geary
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Covert James Geary, Double Jeopardy - Retrial After Reversal of a Conviction on Evidentiary Grounds, 43 La. L. Rev. (1983)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol43/iss4/11
DOUBLE JEOPARDY: RETRIAL AFTER REVERSAL OF A CONVICTION ON
EVIDENTIARY GROUNDS
The defendant was convicted by a jury of the charges of rape
and first degree murder and was sentenced to death. The Florida
Supreme Court, on review,1 held that the only evidence having any
merit was the testimony of the rape victim and noted that serious
doubt had been raised as to her credibility.2 The conviction was re-
versed and a new trial ordered.3 On remand, the trial court dismissed
the case, holding that a reversal by an appellate court on evidentiary
grounds prevented retrial under the double jeopardy clause of the
fifth amendment to the United States Constitution.4 On appeal of the
dismissal, the state appellate courts held that where a reversal was
made on "weight of the evidence" grounds as opposed to a finding
of "insufficient evidence," the protection against double jeopardy did
not bar retrial. ' On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, it
was held that where the evidence has met the test of legal sufficiency
as established in Jackson v. Virginia' but the court reviewing the
jury's verdict finds it against the weight of the evidence, a new trial
is not barred by the double jeopardy clause. Tibbs v. Florida, 102 S.
Ct. 2211 (1982).
As early as the fifteenth century, English courts were using the
term "jeopardy" in connection with a defendant's protection against
Copyright 1983, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. Review was authorized under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.16(b), under
which the Florida Supreme Court would review the evidence supporting the convic-
tion of a defendant who had been sentenced to death and determine whether the in-
terest of justice required a new trial. See note 5, infra, for its repromulgation in 1977
as FLA. R. App. P. 9.140(f) (Supp. 1982).
2. Tibbs v. State, 337 So. 2d 788, 791 (Fla. 1976).
3. The court said, "Our review of the record of this proceeding leaves us with
considerable doubt that Delbert Tibbs is the man who committed the crimes for which
he has been convicted." Id. at 790. The court went on to order a new trial, as the
evidence was not satisfactory to establish the identity of the accused as a participant
in the crime. Id. at 791.
4. "[Nlor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb . . . " U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 2.
5. State v. Tibbs, 370 So. 2d 386 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1979) (reversing
the dismissal), affd, 397 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. 1981). As the state appellate rules were
revised in 1977, review was authorized under FLA. R. App. P. 9.140(f) (West Supp.
1982):
The court shall review all rulings and orders appearing in the record necessary
to pass upon the grounds of an appeal. In the interest of justice, the court may
grant any relief to which any party is entitled. In capital cases, the court shall
review the evidence to determine if the interest of justice requires a new trial,
whether or not insufficiency of the evidence is an issue presented for review.
6. 443 U.S. 307 (1979). The test is "whether, after viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 319.,
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multiple trials.7 The basic premise was that a defendant should not
be tried or punished twice for the same offense In Vaux's Case,9 it
was accepted as established that "the life of a man shall not be twice
put in jeopardy for one and the same offence, and that is the reason
and cause that autrefoits acquitted or convicted of the same offence
is a good plea."' Thus, it was settled at an early date that once a
defendant had been acquitted or convicted, he could not be retried
or repunished for the same offense. Blackstone later summarized four
pleas which gave reasons why the defendant ought not be required
to answer to a prosecution: (1) autrefois acquit, or former acquittal,
(2) autrefois convict, or former conviction, (3) autrefois attaint, or former
attainder, and (4) pardon.1 The plea of autrefois acquit, said Blackstone,
is grounded on this universal maxim of the common law of
England, that no man is to be brought into jeopardy of his life
more than once for the same offence. And hence it is allowed as
a consequence, that when a man is once fairly found not guilty
upon any indictment or other prosecution, before any court having
competent jurisdiction of the offence, he may plead such acquittal
in bar of any subsequent accusation for the same crime. 2
The drafters of the fifth amendment engaged in some debate over
the extent of the protection against double jeopardy that was to be
accorded defendants.'3 A version of the double jeopardy clause pro-
posed by James Madison provided that "[n]o person shall be subject,
except in cases of impeachment, to more than one punishment or one
trial for the same offence."" Representative Benson argued that the
meaning of this provision was doubtful. He contended that although
the traditional rule was that a person should not be put in jeopardy
7. Kirk, "Jeopardy" During the Period of the Year Books, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 602
(1934). See also J. SIGLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A LEGAL AND SOCIAL
PHILOSOPHY (1969) for a discussion of the application of double jeopardy principles in
England at the time of the American Revolution. Several recent Supreme Court deci-
sions also contain excellent discussions of the common law roots of the protection against
double jeopardy. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332 (1974); Bartkus v.
Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 150 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting); Green v. United States, 355
U.S. 184, 198 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
8. See J. SIGLER, supra note 7, at 15.
9. 76 Eng. Rep. 992 (K.B.).
10. Id. at 993.
11. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *335-8. At common law, attainder was an
extinction of civil rights and capacities resulting in the forfeiture of the defendant's
entire estate. It was used as a substituted punishment where the defendant had com-
mitted treason or felony and received the death sentence. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
116 (5th ed. 1979).
12. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at *335-6.
13. See the discussion of this debate in Tibbs, 102 S. Ct. at 2217, n.14.
14. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 434 (J. Gales ed. 1789).
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more than once for the same offense, it was well known that one might
be entitled to more than one trial. The humane intention of the clause,
he argued, was to prevent more than one punishment.15 Representative
Sherman agreed that Madison's suggestion was ambiguous and added
that under the rule existing at that time, one who was found guilty
could not obtain a second trial in his favor. When questions are raised
as to the fairness of the first conviction, he contended, a second trial
would be in the defendant's favor."8 While the House adopted Madison's
language, the concerns voiced there led the Senate to reject Madison's
proposal and substitute the language presently appearing in the dou-
ble jeopardy clause. 7 The phrase "to more than one trial, or punish-
ment" was replaced by "be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."
Thus, the intention of the majority of the drafters of the Bill of Rights
was to permit the state to retry the defendant when he succeeded
in having his conviction set aside.
In the earliest significant case interpreting the double jeopardy
clause, a mistrial had been declared when the jury had been unable
to arrive at a verdict.18 The Supreme Court held that the government
had discretion in retrying a defendant in such a case and, in cases
of "manifest necessity," the defendant could be retried. The Court
also said that retrial is not precluded by the double jeopardy clause
when there has been no conviction or acquittal.1"
Some of the earliest federal cases applying the double jeopardy
clause to appeals held that a new trial was available after a successful
appeal by either the defendant or the prosecution." In 1896, the Court
limited this rule in United States v. Ball,2 which, in an historical con-
text, is one of the most significant cases developing the application
of the double jeopardy clause to reversals of convictions. In Ball, the
first trial of three codefendants resulted in one acquittal and two guilty
verdicts. The two defendants who were found guilty had their con-
victions reversed on appeal on the grounds that the indictments were
defective. Subsequently, all three codefendants were reindicted,
15. Id. at 753.
16. Id.
17. See J. SIGLER, supra note 7, at 31.
18. United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824).
19. Id. at 580. This analysis has continued to the present. In North Carolina v.
Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969), the Court stated that double jeopardy generally con-
sists of three protections: (1) prior acquittals, (2) prior convictions, and (3) multiple
punishments for the same offense.
20. United States v. Harding, 26 F. Cas. 131 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1846) (No. 15,301); United
States v. Shoemaker, 27 F. Cas. 1067 (C.C.D. Ill. 1840) (No. 16,279); United States v.
Keen, 26 F. Cas. 686 (C.C.D. Ind. 1839) (No. 15,510). Cf. United States v. Gibert, 25
F. Cas. 1287 (C.C.D. Mass. 1834) (No. 15,204).
21. 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
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retried, and found guilty. The Supreme Court held on appeal that the
acquittal of the first defendant was a bar to any reindictment of him
for that offense.22 The Court's holding would logically apply to acquit-
tals ordered by any appellate court as well, because it is the acquit-
tal which gives rise to the bar. The defendants who had their indict-
ments set aside, without a judgment of acquittal, could still be retried.'
The distinction was made in Ball between an acquittal and an appellate
dismissal of an indictment. After acquittal, a defendant cannot be
retried for that offense.
In a series of decisions in the middle part of this century, the
Court began to limit the Ball holding. The Court retreated from the
distinction between procedural reversals and evidentiary ones and
began focusing instead on whether the reversal was made at the ap-
pellate or trial court level. A defendant's appeal of his conviction was
construed as a waiver of his protection against double jeopardy.2 ' In
Forman v. United States,25 the Court failed to distinguish between
reversals for procedural errors and reversals for insufficient evidence
altogether. The Court instead cited Ball for the assertion that ap-
pellate reversals did not involve double jeopardy." In 1957, in Green
v. United States,27 the Court described the philosophy behind the dou-
ble jeopardy clause. The policies there enumerated have been cited
and relied upon by federal and state courts through the present:
The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the
Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with
all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated
attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby
subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and com-
pelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity,
as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he
may be found guilty.
The Green policies against a state making repeated attempts to con-
vict a defendant are basically, twofold: it subjects the defendant to
22. Id. at 669.
23. Id. at 672.
24. Bryan v. United States, 338 U.S. 552 (1950) (where defendant successfully
appeals his conviction, he waives any double jeopardy protection he might have); Sapir
v. United States, 348 U.S. 373 (1955) (limiting but affirming, in dicta, the Bryan rule
that when a defendant asks for a new trial, he may not claim double jeopardy); Yates
v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957) (applying the Bryan waiver rule to cases in which
the defendant asks for a new trial in the alternative to a motion for acquittal).
25. 361 U.S. 416 (1960).
26. Id. at 425.
27. 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
28. Id. at 187-88 (Black, J.).
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a continued embarrassment, expense, and ordeal; and it increases the
possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.
The Supreme Court, in the 1960's, began developing the principle
that some appellate reversals may give rise to a valid claim of double
jeopardy. The Court, in United States v. Tateo,2 allowed a retrial where
the defendant's conviction had been reversed because of a procedural
error. The Court's holding that the state could always retry a defen-
dant after a procedural error gave rise to the inference that retrials
might not be allowed following evidentiary reversals. But by 1969,
the Court had yet to go that far, instead only reaffirming Ball, as
well as the Bryan-Forman "waiver" decisions."
In Burks v. United States,31 the Court finally limited Ball to its
facts. The Court noted that Ball allowed retrial after trial error and
stated that the same policies do not apply when the appellate court
finds the evidence legally insufficient to convict the defendant.2 The
Court held unanimously that when the government's case is found
"so lacking that it should not have even been submitted to the jury,""
a retrial is precluded. It is therefore an acquittal, whether at the trial
court or appellate level, that gives rise to the protection against double
jeopardy. In a related case, United States v. Scott," the Court adopted
a definition of an acquittal. Relying on the earlier case of United States
v. Martin Linen Supply Co.,35 the Court held that "a defendant is
acquitted only when 'the ruling of the judge, whatever its label,
actually represents a resolution [in the defendant's favor], correct or
not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged.' "36
In another related case, Greene v. Massey,7 the Court, in dicta,
referred to the granting of a new trial "in the interests of justice"
and expressed no opinion on this matter. 8 Tibbs, holding that a new
trial "in the interests of justice" does not give rise to a valid claim
29. 377 U.S. 463 (1964).
30. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 720 (1969) (stating broadly
that there were no limitations upon the power to retry a defendant who had succeeded
in getting his first conviction set aside).
31. 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
32. Id. at 14-15.
33. Id. at 16.
34. 437 U.S. 82 (1978).
35. 430 U.S. 564 (1977).
36. 437 U.S. at 97 (quoting Martin Linen, 430 U.S. at 571).
37. 437 U.S. 19 (1978).
38. In a more recent case, Hudson v. Louisiana, 450 U.S. 40 (1981), the Court re-
ferred, in dicta, to the awarding of a new trial in a situation where the state trial
judge acts as a "thirteenth juror" and disagrees with the jury's evaluation of conflic-
ting evidence, stating that "nothing in Burks precludes retrial in such a case." Id.
at 44-45 n.5. See infra notes 106-10 and accompanying text.
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of double jeopardy, thus limits Burks to cases where the evidence
is not legally sufficient to support a verdict of guilty.s9
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority in Tibbs, cites United
States v. Ball" as the source of the general rule which allows retrial
after an appellate reversal of a conviction and Burks v. United States1
and Greene v. Massey2 as the sources of the exception prohibiting a
retrial only where the evidence is not legally sufficient to sustain the
verdict. 3 Burks and Greene, as interpreted in Tibbs, rest upon two
closely related policies: the special weight attached to judgments of
acquittal by the double jeopardy clause," and the principle that "[t]he
Double Jeopardy Clause forbids a second trial for the purpose of
affording the prosecution another opportunity to supply evidence which
it failed to muster in the first proceeding."45 These policies do not
apply with the same force when the appellate court disagrees with
the jury's resolution of conflicting evidence. This situation is more
like that of a hung jury than a judgment of acquittal.4"
The distinction between sufficiency and weight of the evidence
has been used by other courts.47 In order for a court to review a con-
viction by testing weight of the evidence presented at trial, an en-
39. 102 S. Ct. at 2217.
40. 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
41. 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
42. 437 U.S. 19 (1978).
43. 102 S. Ct. at 2217. Tibbs was a 5-4 decision. Justice O'Connor wrote for the
majority, which included Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Stevens, and Rehn-
quist. Justice White wrote for the minority, which included Justices Blackmun, Bren-
nan, and Marshall.
44. Id. at 2218.
45. Id. (quoting Burks, 437 U.S. at 11).
46. 102 S. Ct. at 2218. See infra notes 61-70 and accompanying text.
47. One federal appellate court recently described the distinction as follows:
When a motion for new trial is made on the ground that the verdict is contrary
to the weight of the evidence, the issues are far different from those raised by
a motion for judgment of acquittal. The question is not whether the defendant
should be acquitted outright, but only whether he should have a new trial. The
district court need not view the evidence in the light most favorable to the ver-
dict; it may weigh the evidence and in so doing evaluate for itself the credibility
of the witnesses. If the court concludes that, despite the abstract sufficiency of
the evidence to sustain the verdict, the evidence preponderates sufficiently heavily
against the verdict that a serious miscarriage of justice may have occurred, it
may set aside the verdict, grant a new trial, and submit the issues for determina-
tion by another jury.
United States v. Lincoln, 630 F.2d 1313, 1319 (8th Cir. 1980). Earlier, in United States
v. Robinson, 71 F. Supp. 9 (D.D.C. 1947), a district court stated that this power was
recognized at an early date at common law. See also United States v. Turner, 490
F. Supp. 583 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (applying the "weight of the evidence" approach at
the trial court level); United States v. Simms, 508 F. Supp. 1188 (W.D. La. 1980).
NOTES
abling statute is required. 8 The Tibbs Court also notes that it makes
no difference whether a "weight of the evidence" reversal is made
at the trial or appellate court level; the principles and policies apply-
ing are the same."9 The "weight of the evidence" review is essentially
a discretionary tool used by the courts, when so authorized, to order
new trials where an injustice may have occurred.
The "sufficiency of the evidence" test represents the threshold
constitutional standard for review of the evidence presented at trial.
Any verdict which fails to meet this evidentiary standard will be
reversed, and a judgment of acquittal will be ordered." The test for
the sufficiency of the evidence, as defined in Jackson v. Virginia, is
"whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essen-
tial elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."'" The "weight
of the evidence" test is a discretionary review applied as an overlay
of the "sufficiency of the evidence" test. Here, the reviewing court
no longer looks at the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution; instead, it studies the evidence as an independent finder
of fact. A reversal on "weight of the evidence" grounds does not mean
that acquittal was the only proper verdict.5 A reversal on "weight
of the evidence" grounds refers to "a determination [by] the trier of
fact that a greater amount of credible evidence supports one side of
48. 102 S. Ct. at 2220 n.22. The Florida Supreme Court, in allowing the retrial,
stated that it would not permit its state courts to review the weight of the evidence
in the future. 397 So. 2d at 1125. However, the issue remains relevant because of
its application in other jurisdictions. 102 S. Ct. at 2216 (majority), 2222 (dissent).
In Louisiana, for example, the trial judge has discretion under article 851 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure to allow a new trial. Article 851 provides, in pertinent part:
The motion for a new trial is based on the supposition that injustice has been
done the defendant, and, unless such is shown to have been the case the motion
shall be denied, no matter upon what allegations it is grounded.
The court, on motion of the defendant, shall grant a new trial whenever:
(1) The verdict is contrary to the law and the evidence;
(5) The court is of the opinion that the ends of justice would be served by
the granting of a new trial, although the defendant may not he entitled to a new
trial as a matter of strict legal right.
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 allows the court "on motion of [the] defendant
[to] grant a new trial to him if required in the interest of justice" where, for example,
the conviction is against the weight of the evidence. This power to review the eviden-
tiary weight is triggered only by motion under rule 33. 2 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE S 553 (1982).
49. 102 S. Ct. at 2220. Thus, Tibbs has effect in Louisiana, where a new trial may
be ordered by the trial court.
50. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
51. 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).
52. 102 S. Ct. at 2218.
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an issue or cause than the other."53 Thus a reversal on "weight of
the evidence" grounds occurs where the reviewing court has found
the evidence legally sufficient to sustain the verdict but it is not en-
tirely satisfied that the jury's verdict is correct, and it therefore grants
a new trial. This approach is consistent with the definition of acquit-
tal arrived at in Scott.54 Because the evidence has been found legally
sufficient, there has not been an acquittal; therefore, the defendant
may be retried.
The Tibbs Court states that where the defendant, instead of
moving for an acquittal, seeks an acquittal through a new trial, the
appellate court acts as a "thirteenth juror" and weighs the conflict-
ing testimony.5 While the majority contends that this approach does
not violate Burks and Greene, the dissent argues strongly that the
distinction should be between procedural and evidentiary reversals
and that any reversal on evidentiary grounds should bar retrial. 5 The
dissent argues that where the evidence does not support the verdict,
the state should not be allowed to reprosecute. This argument,
however, fails to consider the true nature of the "weight of the
evidence" approach and does not accept that the evidence already has
been found legally sufficient.5" Instead, the dissent argues that any
reversal due to a failure of proof is tantamount to a finding of insuffi-
cient evidence and therefore a retrial should be precluded.' Addition-
ally, the "weight of the evidence" may be a misnomer; this approach
rests not only on evidentiary grounds but on policy grounds as well. 9
Ultimately, awarding a new trial in this situation is in the defendant's
favor. It may cause the reader some concern when the Court states
that "[tihe reversal simply affords the defendant a second opportunity
to seek a favorable judgment."' Surely this does not mean that the
defendant has the burden of proving his innocence. The state already
has presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable trier of fact to con-
vict. A reversal on the weight of the evidence gives the defendant
a chance to have the evidence heard by another jury, with the hope
of securing a more favorable verdict. When seen in this light, the
ordering of a new trial truly is in the defendant's favor. He has re-
ceived a new trial where, as a strict legal matter, his first trial leading
to conviction was fair.
53. Id. at 2216 (quoting Tibbs v. State, 397 So. 2d 1120, 1123 (Fla. 1981)).
54. 437 U.S. 82 (1978). See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
55. 102 S. Ct. at 2218.
56. 102 S. Ct. at 2223 (White, J., dissenting).
57. But see note 80, infra.
58. 102 S. Ct. at 2222 (White, J., dissenting).
59. See infra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
60. 102 S. Ct. at 2219. The dissent misconstrues this ruling as shifting the burden
of proof on retrial. 102 S. Ct. at 2222 (White, J., dissenting).
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As it has been suggested that the situation in Tibbs is analagous
to that of a hung jury, a comparison with hung juries may be helpful.
Generally, trial courts are given the power to allow retrial after the
first trial ends with a deadlocked jury. 1 However, several commen-
tators recently have suggested that a retrial after a hung jury ter-
minates the first trial violates all the principles behind the protection
against double jeopardy and therefore a retrial should be prohibited."2
They assert that when a trial ends with a hung jury, the prosecution
has had a full and fair opportunity to present the state's case. 3 Each
time a mistrial is declared and the case is tried again, the defendant's
presentation will weaken, as his financial resources inevitably dwindle,
and the state, with its virtually unlimited resources and incentive to
present a stronger case, will strengthen its prosecution. Addition-
ally, allowing a retrial "prolongs the period in which [the defendant]
is stigmatized by an unresolved accusation of Wrongdoing." 5 Allow-
ing retrial after having a deadlocked jury, it is argued, thus violates
the policies set forth in Green v. United States, increasing the chance
that an innocent man will be found guilty.
The arguments raised by these commentators carry some weight.
However, the state does not have unlimited resources, and will not
always present a stronger case on retrial. Additionally, its evidence
against the defendant necessarily weakens with the passage of time;
witnesses might be unlocatable, and those who do testify might not
recall the specific facts with clarity sufficient to convince a jury. Still,
these commentators raise the valid concern that perhaps the state
should not be allowed to conduct numerous trials against a defendant.
After a number of trials end in hung juries, perhaps the state should
be allowed to proceed no further.6
The cases allowing retrial after a hung jury build upon the rule
of United States v. Perez,7 decided in 1824. The Court, in Perez, held
61. United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824). In Louisiana, a mistrial
may be ordered where the jury is unable to agree upon a verdict. LA. CODE CRIM.
P. art. 775(2). The Reporter's Comments cite Perez and acknowledge that this dismissal
poses no bar to a subsequent prosecution. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 775(2), comment (c)(4).
62. Findlater, Retrial After a Hung Jury: The Double Jeopardy Problem, 129 U.
PA. L. REV. 701 (1981); Note, Trial Judge's Discretionary Power to Dismiss in Hung
Jury Situations, 47 TENN. L. REV. 198 (1979); Note, Trial Judge's Discretion to Declare
a Mistrial on Basis of Deadlocked Jury, 3 W. ST. L. REV. 344 (1976); Note, Double
Jeopardy and Hung Juries, 5 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 218 (1974).
63. Findlater, supra note 62, at 717.
64. Id. at 713 & 716; Note, Double Jeopardy and Hung Juries, supra note 62, at 231.
65. Findlater, supra note 62, at 715 (quoting Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497
(1978) (Stevens, J.)).
66. See cases cited at note 88, infra.
67. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824). See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
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that jeopardy had not yet attached because no finding as to guilt or
innocence had been made by a jury. Because of the recent Supreme
Court decisions holding that jeopardy attaches long before the jury's
decision is announced, 8 it has been argued that Perez is no longer
controlling and that the above policy concerns will be best served
by preventing retrial.69 However, the Supreme Court consistently has
allowed retrial in cases involving hung juries."0
Applying these arguments to Tibbs, a reversal based on the weight
of the evidence may be even more in violation of the policies behind
the double jeopardy protection than allowing a retrial after a hung
jury. Here, we have a "hung judge" or, even worse, a "hung appellate
court." Perhaps our judicial system, with its concern for efficiency,
should not allow a judge to throw up his arms in the face of a jury
verdict and say, "I don't know." If he is not satisfied with the evidence,
he should acquit. Surely our judges should be more able to make con-
clusive determinations than our juries.
Actually, the argument that in a Tibbs situation the policies are
more in favor of allowing a retrial is stronger than in cases where
there has been a hung jury. A jury has reached a decision: it has
convicted the defendant, giving no indication that it harbors a
reasonable doubt. The policies enumerated in Green7' do not apply
as forcefully against retrying a defendant who has been convicted by
a jury as they do against retrying a defendant whom a jury failed
to convict. Of course, there is a greater possibility that an innocent
man will be found guilty. At the same time, however, he has already
been found guilty in a fair proceeding and has no legal right to a
retrial or other reversal of his conviction. Thus, allowing the defen-
dant a new trial is seen more as an act of mercy than the kind of
government misconduct spoken out against in Green.
The ordering of a new trial after a fair conviction by a jury raises
the concern that the role of the jury system will be undermined by
the reviewing court. Perhaps this is a desirable result; indeed, the
68. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28 (1978) (jeopardy attaches in a jury trial with the
empaneling and swearing of the jury); Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377 (1975)
(jeopardy attaches in a bench trial with the swearing of the first witness).
69. Note, Double Jeopardy and Hung Juries, supra note 62, at 221-24.
70. The Court, in dicta, has stated this assertion repeatedly. Arizona v. Washington,
434 U.S. 497 (1978); United States v. Sanford, 429 U.S. 14 (1976); Illinois v. Somerville,
410 U.S. 458 (1973); Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963); Wade v. Hunter,
336 U.S. 684 (1949). The Court has not recently ruled on any case specifically affirm-
ing the Perez rule allowing retrial after having a deadlocked jury and has recently
passed on an opportunity to do so. United States v. Becton, 632 F.2d 1294 (5th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 837 (1981).
71. 355 U.S. 184 (1957). See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
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jury's role in our criminal trial process has been criticized." One com-
mentator argues that the jury fails to make accurate findings of fact
and fails to apply the law as instructed by the judge; instead, he
argues, the jury returns a general verdict according to the result it
desires.73 At the same time, however, the jury's function is not pri-
marily fact finding; there are more efficient and effective ways of
determining facts in criminal trials. The jury's function is essentially
political; it protects the public from governmental tyranny or at least
from the fear of governmental tyranny.7 4 It can be argued that by
removing the case from the jury, a court is engaging in the kind of
governmental action that the jury system was meant to prevent.
However, the right to a jury trial exists for the defendant.5 Just as
he may waive this right before trial, he logically should be able to
have the jury's verdict reviewed, both for evidentiary sufficiency and
weight. Where a defendant moves for an acquittal and not for a new
trial, the reviewing court is allowed to make only a limited review
for evidentiary sufficiency. 7 A review of evidentiary weight cannot
involuntarily deny a defendant a constitutional right because the
judicial authority for that review lies in the defendant's request. Ad-
ditionally, the court will never review the weight of the evidence
unless the defendant has been found guilty. Where the defendant asks
for a review of the evidence, his right to a trial by jury is not under-
mined so long as the court does not reverse the jury's findings to
his detriment. Indeed, a post-verdict judgment of acquittal goes fur-
ther towards undermining our jury system than an order for retrial
based upon the weight of the evidence. In the latter, the court is not
so much removing the case from a jury's hands as giving it to another
one. With a judgment of acquittal, the court makes a final determina-
tion of reversal of a jury's verdict. 7
72. See, e.g., J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 108-16 (1973); W. SEAGLE, LAW: THE
SCIENCE OF INEFFICIENCY 107-08 (1952); G. WILLIAMS, THE PROOF OF GUILT 271-79 (1963).
73. J. FRANK, supra note 72, at 111.
74. Slovenko, Control Over the Jury Verdict in Louisiana Criminal Law, 20 LA.
L. REV. 657, 700-02 (1960).
75. The sixth amendment of the United States Constitution states, "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an im-
partial jury."
76. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 16 (1978).
In Tibbs, the defendant did not move for a new trial, yet the state supreme court
reviewed the evidence and ordered a new trial. This was done under the state appellate
rule providing that the supreme court would review the evidence supporting the con-
viction of a defendant who had been sentenced to death, as discussed in note 1, supra.
Thus, the state procedure provided for an "automatic motion for a new trial." It is
suggested that this does not remove the case from the jury against the defendant's
wishes, as any defendant who has been sentenced to death surely would allow an ap-
pellate court to review the evidence both for sufficiency and weight.
77. Even Professor Slovenko, who argued that a directed verdict of acquittal under-
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Many courts have stated that the authority to order a new trial
based on the weight of the evidence should be used sparingly.8 Critics
argue that there is no method of ensuring that this authority will
be used sparingly and that this procedure will lead to an abuse of
discretion and undermine both Jackson v. Virginia and Burks."5
It is conceivable that a court may reverse a conviction as "against
the weight of the evidence" for the purpose of allowing retrial where
the evidence is actually insufficient." A court's evaluation of the
evidence behind a guilty verdict is a matter of substance; the form
is not relevant,81 nor is the label used by the court in reviewing the
mines the jury's role, agreed that a defendant should be able to have a jury's verdict
set aside and a new trial ordered. Slovenko, supra note 74, at 692, 695.
78. United States v. Lincoln, 630 F.2d 1313, 1319 (8th Cir. 1980); United States
v. Turner, 490 F. Supp. 583, 593 (E.D. Mich. 1979); United States v. Robinson, 71 F.
Supp. 9, 10 (D.D.C. 1947).
79. 102 S. Ct. at 2223 (White, J., dissenting). See also 18 TRIAL, Sept. 1982, at
49-50.
80. Indeed, this very well may have been the case in Tibbs. The only evidence
produced by the state was the testimony of the 17-year-old rape victim and her iden-
tification of Delbert Lee Tibbs as the perpetrator of the crimes. She admitted having
tried "just about all" types of drugs and that she had smoked marijuana shortly before
the crimes in question. She testified that the crimes occurred in the daylight, while
other evidence indicated that they occurred after nightfall. The truck and gun. used
in the crimes were never recovered. There was no record of Tibbs ever having owned
a gun. Tibbs was hitchhiking through the state before and after the incident, and
there was no evidence apart from the victim's testimony placing him in that part of
the state at the time of the commission of the crimes. Immediately after the crimes,
the rape victim moved back in with the man she had deserted in St. Petersburg when
she eloped with the murder victim, giving rise to the inference that she may have
lied to protect him. The defendant, on the other hand, was a college-educated writer
who was hitchhiking through the state to learn more about how people live. He
cooperated fully with police, and witnesses testifying to his good reputation as a law-
abiding citizen went unrebutted. The state's other evidence, such as Tibbs' cellmate
who claimed Tibbs confessed to him, was either substantially discredited or added
nothing to the case against him. See 101 S. Ct. at 2214, 2216; 337 So. 2d at 792 (Boyd,
J., concurring specially in the Florida Supreme Court's first hearing of the case).
The evidence against Tibbs may have been legally insufficient; it is arguable that,
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a reasonable juror
could not convict the defendant. Indeed, after the United States Supreme Court's deci-
sion, the Florida state prosecutors entered a nolle prosequi, perhaps fearing that the
testimony of the rape victim, who was then undergoing drug rehabilitation treatment,
would not be believed. Telephone conversation with Mr. Louis R. Belier of Miami Beach,
Florida, the defendant's attorney (Jan. 11, 1983).
This suggestion does not lead the author to conclude that the Court erred in sanc-
tioning the "weight of the evidence" review. The Court held that the due process
requirement had been satisfied. 102 S. Ct. at 2220 n.21. For purposes of analyzing
the propriety of the weight of the evidence review, that aspect of the holding will
be accepted as correct. However, the case in which the Supreme Court affirmed the
validity of the weight of the evidence review also serves as an example of its poten-
tial abuses.
81. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 (1977).
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evidence.2 As the Tibbs Court points out, due process limitations pre-
vent abuse;' if the evidence is actually insufficient, the court's deci-
sion should not stand on appeal. Although it does not undermine Burks,
the holding in Tibbs certainly limits Burks to those instances where
the evidence is found insufficient as a matter of law. Other courts
have shown a desire to limit Burks," and courts in the future should
follow up on the suggestion in Tibbs that Burks is a very narrow
exception to the rule allowing retrial after appellate reversal." As
mentioned earlier, an order for retrial based on the weight of the
evidence may rest on subjective policy grounds as well as the court's
own weighing of the evidence.8 The Tibbs Court states, "[Tihe weight
of the evidence rule .... often derives from a mandate to act in the
interests of justice .... Although reversal of a first conviction based
on sharply conflicting testimony may serve the interests of justice,
reversal of a second conviction based on the same evidence may not."'
Thus, while the Florida Supreme Court awarded Tibbs a new trial
based on its concern for fair play and in the interests of justice, it
may be more likely to uphold a second conviction on the same
evidence.88 The dissenters see the holding in Tibbs as a strictly eviden-
tiary ruling, one which is rigid and inflexible. The dissenters' argu-
ment that this holding has been an evidentiary reversal as a matter
of state statutory law which should be tantamount to an acquittal
fails to take into account the true nature of the "weight of the
evidence" ruling."
Tibbs also raises questions concerning judicial efficiency. As a
matter of judicial efficiency, perhaps it would be better to prevent
82. Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23, 31 (1977).
83. 102 S. Ct. at 2220.
84. See, e.g., Lydon v. Commonwealth, 381 Mass. 356, 409 N.E.2d 745 (1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1065 (in a two-tiered system, if a defendant elects a bench trial, he
must first undergo a second trial de novo before he can appeal; as the appeal is limited
to the findings of the second trial, any possible evidentiary insufficiency in the first
trial goes unreviewed); Maryland v. Boone, 40 Md. App. 41, 393 A.2d 1361 (1978) (where,
because of trial error, evidence was improperly admitted and there was not sufficient
admissible evidence to sustain the verdict, the state supreme court based its reversal
on "trial error," not insufficient evidence, and allowed a retrial).
85. See United States v. Curtis, 683 F.2d 769, 773 (3d Cir. 1982), where the court
states that the "stringency" of the Burks policy was highlighted in the Tibbs decision.
86. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
87. 102 S. Ct. at 2219 n.18.
88. Conceivably, a number of successive reversals against the weight of the
evidence could give rise to a valid double jeopardy claim. This problem has been con-
sidered in the hung jury context. In United States v. Castellanos, 478 F.2d 749 (2d
Cir. 1973), the Second Circuit allowed a third trial after the first two ended with hung
juries. But in Preston v. Blackledge, 332 F. Supp. 681 (E.D.N.C. 1971), the court barred
a fifth trial after four successive hung juries, sustaining the defendant's claim of dou-
ble jeopardy. See also commentaries cited in note 62, supra.
89. 102 S. Ct. at 2222 (White, J., dissenting).
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retrial whenever the Jackson v. Virginia' test has been satisfied. Both
the defendant and the state have an interest in the finality of the
litigation. Additionally, the evidence will be much harder to evaluate
on retrial. In Tibbs, the incident in question occurred on or about
February 3, 1974.91 While it will be hard for the witnesses to an event
which occurred nine years ago to testify as to specific facts, cross-
examination also will be more difficult.
The Supreme Court in Tibbs, however, is leaning away from
notions of judicial efficiency and towards a concern for fair play. After
Jackson v. Virginia, one reasonably could have inferred that the
Supreme Court was moving in the direction of a standard severely
limiting the situations where a defendant could be retried. Such a
harsh standard would have tended to discourage reviewing judges
from reversing convictions in situations where they harbored only
minor doubts as to the fairness of the first trial. Tibbs' policy encourag-
ing retrial indicates that the Court is not moving towards such a harsh
standard. By encouraging reviewing courts to act "in the interests
of justice," the Supreme Court is promoting a fair process. Upon
reviewing Tibbs' conviction, the Florida Supreme Court expressed a
doubt, perhaps a subjective one, as to the fairness of the first
conviction. 2 At that point, the "interest of justice" in allowing a retrial
after a reversal on weight of the evidence grounds outweighed the
concern for judicial efficiency. This guarantee of a fair trial process
is surely worth the comparatively small price of having to retry the
defendant. 3
The most troublesome aspect of the Tibbs holding is the sugges-
tion that the prosecution might be allowed to present additional
evidence on retrial.9" The purpose of preventing a retrial after an
acquittal is to require the prosecutor to gather all available evidence
and present his best case in one trial; he should not be allowed to
produce more and more evidence over successive trials until he has
enough evidence to convict. This is the kind of governmental miscon-
duct spoken out against in Green.5 After a reversal on procedural
grounds, a retrial is allowed because the prosecutor has no motive
90. 443 U.S. 307 (1979). See tests discussed in supra notes 50-51 and accompany-
ing text.
91. 102 S. Ct. at 2213.
92. 337 So. 2d at 791; 397 So. 2d at 1126.
93. The retrial should be less expensive for the state to prosecute than most
original trials. The state already has investigated the case and has gathered sufficient
evidence to sustain a conviction. Costs in preparation for the retrial should be little,
if any.
94. The opinion states that it is not necessary but it is possible for the prosecu-
tion to offer new evidence on retrial. 102 S. Ct. at 2219 nn.18-19.
95. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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to gather additional evidence, as he does after a reversal on eviden-
tiary grounds. As one commentator stated about procedural reversals:
[T]he prosecutor need not feel he certainly must do a better job
on retrial. The rate of reconviction following reversal on appeal
is sufficiently high to warrant an assumption that, unless key
defense evidence has been excluded, reconviction is the likely
result. The prosecutor therefore has no special incentive to seek
out a more favorable jury, uncover additional evidence, polish the
testimony of his witnesses, or otherwise strengthen his case,
thereby enhancing the risk that an innocent defendant will be con-
victed. In sum, when reversal stems from grounds other than in-
sufficiency of the evidence, neither Green interest justifies deny-
ing the state its opportunity to retry."
However, the defendant presumably has asked for and received a new
trial. As the Tibbs majority properly points out, there is no constitu-
tional prohibition against allowing the prosecutor to introduce addition-
al evidence on retrial where the conviction has been reversed as
against the weight of the evidence. But allowing the prosecutor to
introduce additional evidence on retrial may undermine the policies
enumerated in Green, and it is contrary to the purpose of allowing
the retrial-to let another jury pass judgment on the evidence
presented against the defendant. Retrial is not allowed to see whether
the prosecutor can do a better job of getting the defendant convicted;
retrial is allowed to determine whether the facts as presented can
convince a jury, in a manner which will satisfy reviewing judges, that
the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Introduction of
additional evidence violates the Green policy by allowing the state
"with all its resources and power . .. to make repeated attempts to
convict" and by "enhancing the possibility that even though innocent
[the defendant] may be found guilty."97
On a theoretical level, the prosecution need not adduce additional
evidence on retrial, as it already has introduced a legally sufficient
amount of evidence. On a practical level, however, the prosecution
has been alerted to the fact that its case is not solid. The reversal
will motivate the prosecution to uncover and produce more evidence
and make a more effective presentation at retrial. If the purpose in
granting retrial is to "allow the defendant a second chance," the pro-
secution should not be given another chance to introduce evidence,
because this is in contradiction to the established policies supporting
the protection against double jeopardy. As the dissent points out,
Burks implements the principle that "[tihe Double Jeopardy Clause
96. Findlater, supra note 62, at 730.
97. Green, 355 U.S. at 187-88.
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forbids a second trial for the purpose of affording the prosecution
another opportunity to supply evidence which it failed to muster in
the first proceeding.""8 The prosecution "has been given one fair op-
portunity to offer whatever proof it could assemble."99 When a rever-
sal is made on "weight of the evidence" grounds, as opposed to a
reversal for trial error, the prosecutor will try to "remedy the defect
in his proofs, an opportunity that the double jeopardy clause forbids."'00
On retrial, the defendant is allowed to produce additional evidence
disproving his guilt. The Tibbs majority recognizes that as the defen-
dant has been given another trial for the purpose of seeking a more
favorable judgment, he should be allowed to produce additional
evidence or otherwise strengthen his arguments.1 ' Fair play, therefore,
requires that the prosecution be allowed to use additional evidence
in rebuttal of whatever new contentions the defendant makes; fair
play does not dictate that the state should use its resources to make
sure it does a better job when it was required to present its best
case at the first trial. Thus it is strongly suggested that, as a pro-
phylactic rule protecting the defendant's constitutional rights, the pro-
secution be prevented from presenting additional evidence in its case
in chief against a defendant whose conviction has been reversed as
being "against the weight of the evidence" or "in the interests of
justice."
The decision in Tibbs is useful in that it provides the kind of
"bright line rule" that courts often seem to avoid. In Louisiana the
clear line of demarcation, after Tibbs, between "weight" and "suffi-
ciency" of the.evidence and the limitation of Burks should provide
guidance for our courts in an area where there has been a lack of
clarity in the past.
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 851 imposes upon
the trial judge the duty0 2 to review the jury's verdict upon a defen-
dant's motion for a new trial and authorizes him to grant a new trial
where the verdict is contrary to the law and the evidence0 3 and where,
in his opinion, the ends of justice would be served thereby.' 4 The
initial interpretation in Louisiana of Burks v. United States'° was that
98. 102 S. Ct. at 2222-23 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting the majority opinion at
102 S. Ct. at 2218; also quoting Burks, 437 U.S. at 11).
99. Burks, 437 U.S. at 16.
100. Findlater, supra note 62, at 729.
101. 102 S. Ct. at 2219 n.19.
102. State v. Jones, 288 So. 2d 48 (La. 1973); State v. Daspit, 167 La. 53, 118 So.
690 (1928).
103. LA. CODE CRIM. P art. 851(1).
104. LA. CODE CRIM. P art. 851(5).
105. 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
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where there was "no evidence" in support of the verdict, an acquittal
was mandated, and where there was "insufficient evidence," retrial
was allowed under article 851(1)." In the initial case, State v. Hud-
son, the trial judge had granted a new trial while giving only vaguely
worded oral reasons for his order. The supreme court held that there
was some, albeit insufficient, evidence in support of the verdict and
allowed retrial. 117 Justice Tate, concurring, argued that the trial judge
actually had granted a new trial to serve the ends of justice under
article 851(5).2" The United States Supreme Court unanimously
reversed."9 A retrial was barred under Burks, it held, not only where
there was "no evidence" but where there was "insufficient evidence"
as well.1 ' Thus, after Hudson, some doubt existed as to whether a
Louisiana trial judge could order a new trial under article 851(1), as
well as to how he might reverse a jury's verdict as being supported
by insufficient evidence. The only way a defendant could have the
evidence supporting his conviction reviewed was by asking for a new
trial under article 851. In 1982, the Louisiana Legislature moved to
clarify this area. It enacted article 821, providing a post-verdict motion
for acquittal." ' Where the defendant so moves, the trial court may
examine the verdict for insufficient evidence under Jackson v.
Virginia.
11
The Supreme Court's holding in Tibbs defines and gives constitu-
tional credence to the different policies and standards applying to the
two post-verdict motions now available to a defendant. Where a motion
for acquittal is made and granted, Burks-type policies apply and a
retrial is barred."' Where the defendant moves for a new trial under
article 851(1) or (5), the Tibbs-type weighing applies and the double
jeopardy clause does not preclude retrial. A convicted defendant who
106. State v. Hudson, 373 So. 2d 1294 (La. 1979).
107. Id. at 1297.
108. Id. at 1298.
109. Hudson v. Louisiana, 450 U.S. 40 (1981). See Joseph, Developments in the Law,
1980-1981-Postconviction Procedure, 42 LA. L. REV. 693, 696 (1982).
110. 450 U.S. at 43. Indicating what it would eventually hold in Tibbs, the Court
addressed Justice Tate's concurring opinion in dicta and said that nothing in Burks
precludes retrial where the state trial judge has acted as a "thirteenth juror" and
ordered a new trial. Id. at 44-5, n.5.
111. 1982 La. Acts, No. 144, adding LA. CODE CRIM. P art. 821.
112. 443 U.S. 307 (1979). The reporter's comments to article 821 indicate that Jackson
v. Virginia is the standard used here. The comments also indicate that if the evidence
is legally insufficient, a "modified verdict," perhaps guilty of a lesser included offense
for which there is sufficient evidence, could be entered. This approach was not ruled
upon in Tibbs.
113. Where a defendant files a motion for a post-verdict judgment of acquittal
in a bench case, it will be treated as a motion for a new trial. State v. Vaccaro, 411
So. 2d 415 (La. 1982).
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wants a bench order of acquittal no longer has to request a new trial,
as he did in the past. A defendant, of course, may move for acquittal
and for a new trial in the alternative. In such a case, a trial judge
ordering reversal should be explicit as to which standard he has
applied; this has important implications for appellate review as well
as for double jeopardy." 4
In Tibbs v. Florida, the Supreme Court has defined the narrow
limitations of a judgment of acquittal, preventing retrial after the
reversal of a jury's guilty verdict only where the evidence is insuffi-
cient as a matter of law. The Court has given the lower courts a
clearly drawn rule to follow, drawing the line between evidentiary
weight and evidentiary sufficiency. Tibbs also represents an adherence
in our judicial system to a preference of a guarantee of a fair trial
procedure over a concern for speed, efficiency, and finality of judg-
ment. While it is in the defendant's favor to allow a retrial after the
reversal of a conviction as being against the weight of the evidence,
it is strongly suggested that the prosecution be prevented from
presenting any new evidence in its case in chief.
Covert James Geary
114. A Louisiana appellate court cannot review a trial court's ruling upon a motion
for a new trial. State v. Jack, 332 So. 2d 464 (La. 1976). As a determination of eviden-
tiary sufficiency is made as a matter of law, appellate courts have authority to review
such determinations made by the trial court or to make such determinations on their
own.
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